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Judge Frank M. Coffin, of the United States Court of 
Appeals, First Circuit, has put into a single sentence of his 
opinion in BRUNO STILLMAN, INC. v THE GLOBE NEWSPAPERS (1980), 
the essence of the Robert Hohler case.
He said: "In determining what if any limits should be
placed upon the granting of such requests (for discovery of 
testimony) courts must balance the potential harm to the free 
flow of information that might result against the asserted 
need for the required information."
That is what this case is about. The courts have been 
struggling with this problem since 1958 when GARLAND v TORRE, 
raised the issue, and they have increasingly acknowledged the 
existence of a testimonial privilege residing in the press. 
Torre went against the press, but acknowledged that there could 
be situations where the privilege existed.
BRANZBURG v HAYES, U. S. Supreme Court, 1972, enlarged 
upon the principle or privilege, and although it went against 
the press, Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion set forth 
the need to balance demonstrated need for disclosure against 
the requirements of a free press. Justice Potter Stewart in 
a dissent in which Brennan and Marshall joined, held that 
journalists should not be required to reveal confidential 
information to a grand jury unless the government could show 
there was probable cause to believe the newsman had information 
clearly relevant to the specific probable violation of law, 
and demonstrated that the information sought could not be 
obtained by alternative means less destructive of First 
Amendment rights, and demonstrate a compelling and over-riding 
interest in the information. (Testimonial Privileges, Page 
418)
Interest in this balance grew over the years as law 
enforcement officials began to use more frequently the power
2to subpoena reporters and editors to testify in criminal and 
civil cases. From 1970 to 1975 there were 500 subpoenas.
They have been almost too numerous to count since: the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press from 1986 to
September 1987 has had 1,500 calls for legal advice on the
subject. Maine, according to David Cheever, of the Maine
Attorney General's office, has had three journalist subpoenas 
in the last two years and five requests for reporter testimony, 
but he acknowledges his information is imcomplete.
Other events in this effort to unfold a rule have included 
many cases in the circuit courts, such as:
STATE v ST. PETER, in 1974, a Vermont case in which infor­
mation sought from a journalist was held not related to guilt 
or innocence.
RILEY v CITY OF CHESTER, in the Third Circuit Court in
1979, in which the court refused to enforce disclosure because 
the journalistic source was only marginally related and the 
court refused to enforce disclosure.
BRUNO STILLMAN, INC. v THE GLOBE NEWSPAPERS, 1980, in 
the First Circuit, where testimony was not required because 
of the impact on the journalistic newsgathering ability had 
not been sufficiently weighed in the district court. In a
footnote, Judge Coffin cited the late Alexander Bickel, who
said: "The issue is the public’s right to know. That right 
is the reporters by virtue of the proxy which the freedom of 
the press clause of the First Amendment gives to the press 
in behalf of the public." Another footnote called attention 
to Branzberg’s stating that "without some protection for seeking 
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 
This, said Coffin, points to the kind of Constitutionally 
sensitized balancing process stressed by Justice Powell in 
Branzberg.
The Department of Justice, long ago recognized the problem 
and 14 years ago in 1973 issued a guideline regulating the
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government’s power to issue subpoenas to the media. As
summarized in the Practicing Law Institute’s Communications 
Handbook, the guidelines ’’gave reporters a qualified privilege 
against government subpoenas. Members of the media could not 
be subpoenaed if the desired information was obtainable through 
alternative sources or investigative steps. They could be 
subpoenaed only in criminal cases, and then only if the govern­
ment had reason to believe the information sought was essential 
to the investigation of a crime that had occurred. Subpoenas
were to be limited to matters concerning the accuracy of
published information except under exigent circumstances and 
were not to involve volumes of unpublished materials.”
The modern version of these guidelines appears in the 
1980 rules of Judicial Administration, Title 28, section 50.10. 
They set forth the widely known three-fold rule of: relevance
to the case, availability of alternative sources, and the degree 
to which the sought information is essential to the conduct
of the case. The guidelines also provide that no subpoena 
may be issued to the media without the express authorization 
of the Attorney General.
In a preamble to the detailed guides, the Department of 
Justice says that ”in determining whether to request the
issuance of a subpoena to a member of the news media....the
approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance 
between the public’s interest in the free dissemination of
ideas and information and the public’s interest in effective 
law enforcement.”
The Law Institute’s Communications Law of 1986, Vol. II, 
notes the litigation since the issue of the guidelines. In
the Federal Circuit courts, newspaper privilege to withhold
has been recognized in the D.C. Circuit, the First Circuit, 
the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit,
the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and 
the Eleventh Circuit. It has been recognized at the district 
level in the Sixth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. District 
Courts are in conflict in the Ninth Circuit.
4The work of Stone and Liebmann, in the Trial Practise 
Series, published by McGraw Hill, notes that "the journalists 
First Amendment privilege has gained such widespread acceptance 
that its applicability in most situations is no longer open 
to question. There is now a sufficiently large body of law 
dealing with the privilege that its contents are fairly well 
defined."
One notable Circuit Court opinion is that of the District 
of Columbia circuit court holding that "compelled disclosure 
by a journalist must be fa last resort after pursuit of other 
opportunities has failed1." (Page 442, Stone and Liebmann.)
In the only reported federal case where the prosecution 
sought to compel a journalist to confirm that a defendant had 
made statements attributed to him in the journalist’s article, 
disclosure was denied. S and L 443. U.S. v BLANTON 534 Fed 
Supp 295 (SD Fla 1982). In this case S and L say: "A reporter 
was subpoenaed to appear at trial for the sole purpose of
verifying that the defendant had made the statements attributed 
to him in a published article. The district court held that
even this limited imposition would have a chilling effect on 
press operations and quashed the subpoena for failure to 
exhaust non-media avenues for obtaining the same or equivalent 
information."
Stone/Liebmann after an exhaustive study of cases, con­
cludes that "In recent years, courts have broadened their 
conception of the press interests threatened by compelled
disclosure. Forced production of any unpublished material 
or information is now widely seen to constitute a serious
intrusion on the press’s functional autonomy in newsgathering 
and editing, an autonomy deemed vital to the press’s effective 
fulfillment of its societal role."
They also acknowledge that "journalists are generally 
considered to have no significant interest, or a substantionally
A
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materials in the following circumstances: (1) when they have
previously published or broadcast the information, (2) when 
the information involves criminal events to which they were 
eye witnesses, and (3) when the information was not obtained 
in a newsgathering or editorial role.”
Hohler’s information was published, but as I understand 
the situation he faced a threat that he would be asked questions 
beyond the published material in cross examination, and there 
was no enumeration of or specification limiting the issues 
to published matter in the order to appear and testify.
It is against this background on the state of the law 
that I think we must examine the Hohler case. From the
testimony of Assistant Attorney General Thomas Goodwin I gather 
that: (1) He obtained the indictment of Richard Steeves without
Hohlerf s story; (2) He was confident that he had a prosecutable 
case without ever knowing of it; (3) he commenced the trial 
of the case without having issued a subpoena to get Hohler 
to testify. His conduct did not conform to the rules of the 
U. S. Department of Justice or the policy prevailing in the 
circuit courts generally, in that: (1) he had alternative
sources for the same information in a statement given to his
own investigator; (2) he did not seek other sources; (3) 
he did not feel Hohler’s testimony essential to convict (and 
in fact it proved unnecessary in the trial of the case.)
Given the state of the law and the facts in this case, 
in my opinion, the subpoena should not have been issued, no 
contempt charge should have been made, there should have been 
no prosecution of Hohler for contempt of court, and he should 
not have been tried and convicted. I think the Maine Attorney 
General ought to have guidelines like those laid down by the
Attorney General of the United States. I think the conduct 
of the Attorney General's office, in its reckless efforts to
6use the press, is a threat to freedom of the press; a violation 
of the Constitution of the United States as it is generally
construed in the federal courts at this time (even though an
affirmative case has not reached the U. S. Supreme Court.)
Robert Hohler was tried and convicted for an act inspired
by his professional belief in the right of the press to a
testimonial withholding privilege consistent with the prepon­
derant views of the federal courts, many state courts, and 
the U. S. Department of Justice. He is, in my opinion, the 
victim of an outrageous miscarriage of justice.
James Russell Wiggins
